What Measure of Inflation Should a Central Bank Target? by Mankiw, N. Gregory & Reis, Ricardo
 
What Measure of Inflation Should a Central Bank Target?
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Ricardo Reis. 2003. What measure of
inflation should a central bank target? Journal of the European
Economic Association 1(5): 1058-1086.
Published Version doi:10.1162/154247603770383398
Accessed February 18, 2015 3:17:40 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3415322
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAWHAT MEASURE OF INFLATION SHOULD
A CENTRAL BANK TARGET?
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
Ricardo Reis
Harvard University
Abstract
This paper assumes that a central bank commits itself to maintaining an inﬂation target and
then asks what measure of the inﬂation rate the central bank should use if it wants to
maximize economic stability. The paper ﬁrst formalizes this problem and examines its
microeconomic foundations. It then shows how the weight of a sector in the stability price
index depends on the sector’s characteristics, including size, cyclical sensitivity, sluggishness
of price adjustment, and magnitude of sectoral shocks. When a numerical illustration of the
problem is calibrated to U.S. data, one tentative conclusion is that a central bank that wants
to achieve maximum stability of economic activity should use a price index that gives
substantial weight to the level of nominal wages. (JEL: E42, E52, E58)
Over the past decade, many central banks around the world have adopted
inﬂation targeting as a guide for the conduct of monetary policy. In such a
regime, the price level becomes the economy’s nominal anchor, much as a
monetary aggregate would be under a monetarist policy rule. Inﬂation targeting
is often viewed as a way to prevent the wild swings in monetary policy that were
responsible for, or at least complicit in, many of the macroeconomic mistakes of
the past. A central bank committed to inﬂation targeting would likely have
avoided both the big deﬂation during the Great Depression of the 1930s and the
accelerating inﬂation of the 1970s (and thus the deep disinﬂationary recession
that followed).
This paper takes as its starting point that a central bank has adopted a regime
of inﬂation targeting and asks what measure of the inﬂation rate it should target.
Our question might at ﬁrst strike some readers as odd. Measures of the overall
price level, such as the consumer price index, are widely available and have
been amply studied by index-number theorists. Yet a price index designed to
measure the cost of living is not necessarily the best one to serve as a target for
a monetary authority.
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© 2003 by the European Economic AssociationThis issue is often implicit in discussions of monetary policy. Many
economists pay close attention to “core inﬂation,” deﬁned as inﬂation excluding
certain volatile prices, such as food and energy prices. Others suggest that
commodity prices might be particularly good indicators because they are highly
responsive to changing economic conditions. Similarly, during the U.S. stock
market boom of the 1990s, some economists called for Fed tightening to
dampen “asset price inﬂation,” suggesting that the right index for monetary
policy might include not only the prices of goods and services but asset prices
as well. Various monetary proposals can be viewed as inﬂation targeting with a
nonstandard price index: The gold standard uses only the price of gold, and a
ﬁxed exchange rate uses only the price of a foreign currency.
In this paper, we propose and explore an approach to choosing a price index
for the central bank to target. We are interested in ﬁnding the price index that,
if kept on an assigned target, would lead to the greatest stability in economic
activity. This concept might be called the stability price index.
The key issue in the construction of any price index is the weights assigned
to the prices from different sectors of the economy. When constructing a price
index to measure the cost of living, the natural weights are the share of each
good in the budget of typical consumer. When constructing a price index for the
monetary authority to target, additional concerns come into play: the cyclical
sensitivity of each sector, the proclivity of each sector to experience idiosyn-
cratic shocks, and the speed with which the prices in each sector respond to
changing conditions.
Our goal in this paper is to show how the weights in a stability price index
should depend on these sectoral characteristics. Section 1 sets up the problem.
Section 2 examines the microeconomic foundations for the problem set forth in
Section 1. Section 3 presents and discusses the analytic solution for the special
case with only two sectors. Section 4 presents a more realistic numerical
illustration, which we calibrate with plausible parameter values for the U.S.
economy. One tentative conclusion is that the stability price index should give
a substantial weight to the level of nominal wages.
1. The Optimal Price Index: Statement of the Problem
Here we develop a framework to examine the optimal choice of a price index.
To keep things simple, the model includes only a single period of time. The
central bank is committed to inﬂation targeting in the following sense: Before
the shocks are realized, the central bank must choose a price index and commit
itself to keeping that index on target.
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characteristics:
(1) Sectors differ in their budget share and thus the weight their prices
receive in a standard price index;
(2) In some sectors equilibrium prices are highly sensitive to the business
cycle, while in other sectors equilibrium prices are less cyclical;
(3) Some sectors experience large idiosyncratic shocks, while other sectors
do not;
(4) Some prices are ﬂexible, while others are sluggish in responding to
changing economic conditions.
To formalize these sectoral differences, we borrow from the so-called “new
Keynesian” literature on price adjustment. We begin with an equation for the
equilibrium price in sector k:
p* k  p  kx  k (1)
where, with all variables expressed in logs, p* k is the equilibrium price in sector
k, p is the price level as conventionally measured (such as the CPI), k is the
sensitivity of sector k’s equilibrium price to the business cycle, x is the output
gap (the deviation of output from its natural level), and k is an idiosyncratic
shock to sector k with variance k
2. This equation says only that the equilibrium
relative price in a sector depends on the state of the business cycle and some
other shock. Sectors can differ in their sensitivities to the cycle and in the
variances of their idiosyncratic shocks.
In Section 2 we examine some possible microeconomic foundations for this
model, but readers may be familiar with the equation for the equilibrium price
from the literature on price setting under monopolistic competition.
1 The index
p represents the nominal variable that shifts both demand and costs, and thus the
equilibrium prices, in all the sectors. This variable corresponds to a standard
price index such as the CPI. That is, if there are K sectors,
p  
k1
K
kpk
where k are the weights of different sectors in the typical consumer’s budget.
The output gap x affects the equilibrium price by its inﬂuence on marginal cost
and on the pricing power of ﬁrms. One interpretation of the shocks k is that they
represent sectoral shocks to productivity. In addition, they include changes in
the degree of competition in sector k. The formation of an oil cartel, for instance,
would be represented by a positive value of k in the oil sector.
1. For a textbook treatment, see Romer (2001, Equation 6.45).
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by assuming that some fraction of prices in a sector is predetermined. One
rationale for this approach, following Fischer (1977), is that some prices are set
in advance by nominal contracts. An alternative rationale, following Mankiw
and Reis (2002), is that price setters are slow to update their plans because there
are costs to acquiring or processing information. In either case, the key feature
for the purpose at hand is that some prices in the economy are set based on old
information and do not respond immediately to changing circumstances.
Let k be the fraction of the price setters in sector k that set their prices
based on updated information, while 1  k set prices based on old plans and
outdated information. Thus, the price in period t is determined by
pk  kp* k  1  kEp* k. (2)
The parameter k measures how sluggish prices are in sector k. The smaller is
k, the less responsive actual prices are to news about equilibrium prices. As k
approaches 1, the sector approaches the classical benchmark where actual and
equilibrium prices are always the same.
The central bank is assumed to be committed to targeting inﬂation. That is,
the central bank will keep a weighted average of sectoral prices at a given level,
which we can set equal to zero without loss of generality. We can write this as

k1
K
	kpk  0 (3)
for some set of weights such that

k1
K
	k  1.
We will call {	k} the target weights and {k} the consumption weights. The
target weights are choice variables of the central bank. The sectoral character-
istics (k, k, k, and k
2) are taken as exogenous.
We assume that the central bank dislikes volatility in economic activity.
That is, its goal is to minimize Var(x). We abstract from the problem of
monetary control by assuming that the central bank can hit precisely whatever
nominal target it chooses. The central question of this paper is the choice of
weights {	k} that will lead to greatest macroeconomic stability.
Putting everything together, the central bank’s problem can now be stated
as follows:
min
	k
Varx
subject to:
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k1
K
	kpk  0

k1
K
	k  1
pk  kp* k  1  kEp* k
p* k  p  kx  k
p  
k1
K
kpk.
The central bank chooses the weights in its targeted price index in order to
minimize volatility in the output gap, given the constraints the economy imposes
on the evolution of prices over time. The solution to this problem will yield the
set of weights 	k in an optimal price index as a function of sector characteristics,
which include k, k, k, and k
2. We call the resulting measure the stability price
index, because it is the price index that, if kept on target, would lead to the
greatest possible stability in economic activity.
At this point, there are two questions that might intrigue readers of this
paper. What are the microfoundations behind this problem? What is the solution
to this problem? Those interested in the ﬁrst question should continue on to
Section 2. Those interested only in the second question should jump to Sec-
tion 3.
2. Some Microeconomic Foundations
In this section we build a general equilibrium model that delivers, in reduced
form, the problem presented in the previous section. We approach this task
aiming for simplicity rather than generality. We suspect that the stability-price-
index problem, or some variant of it, arises in settings more general than the one
we examine here. Our goal now is to give one example and, at the same time,
to relate the stability-price-index problem to the large new Keynesian literature
on price adjustment.
2.1 The Economy Without Nominal Rigidities
The economy is populated by a continuum of yeoman farmers, indexed by their
sector k and by i within this sector. They derive utility from consumption C and
disutility from labor Lki, according to the common utility function:
1062 Journal of the European Economic Association September 2003 1(5):1058–1086UC, Lki 
C
1
1  
 Lki.
There are many types of consumption goods. Following Spence (1976) and
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we model the household’s demand for these goods
using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate. Final consumption C
is a CES aggregate over the goods in the K sectors of the economy:
C 
k1
K
k
1/
Ck

1/


/
1
. (4)
The parameter 
 measures the elasticity of substitution across the K sectors. The
weights k sum to one and express the relative size of each sector.
Within each sector, there are many farmers, represented by a continuum
over the unit interval. The sector’s output is also a CES aggregate of the
farmers’ outputs:
Ck 
0
1
Cki

1/
di

/
1
. (5)
Notice that, for simplicity, we have assumed that the elasticity of substitution is
the same across sectors and across ﬁrms within a sector.
2
Each farmer uses his labor to operate a production function, which takes the
simple form:
Yki  e
ak1  Lki
1/1. (6)
The ak stand for random productivity shock and  is a parameter that determines
the degree of returns to scale in production.
The household’s budget constraint is, for the agent that supplies good k, i:

k1
K  PkiCkidi  Bki  PkiYki.
The household obtains income from selling the good it produces in the market
for the price Pki, and spends its income on the consumption goods Cki. There are
complete markets in the economy that allow the household to insure itself
against his idiosyncratic income risk due to the specialization in production. The
state-contingent payment associated with such bonds is represented by Bki.
2. As is usual, there are two ways to interpret these CES aggregators. The more common
approach is to view them as representing consumers’ taste for variety. Alternatively, one can view
C as the single ﬁnal good that consumers buy and the CES aggregators as representing production
functions for producing that ﬁnal good from intermediate goods.
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sector and each good. It is useful to begin by ﬁrst deﬁning these price indices:
3
P 
k1
K
kPk
1

1/1

,
Pk 
0
1
Pki
1
di
1/1

.
The demand function can then be expressed as:
Ck 
Pk
P


kC, and
Cki 
Pki
Pk


Ck (7)

Pki
P


kC.
The quantity demanded of the good produced by ﬁrm i in sector k is a function
of its relative price, Pki/P, with an elasticity of demand of 
. It also depends on
the sector size k and aggregate consumption C. Since there are complete
markets ensuring that all farmers have the same disposable income and they
have the same preferences, they will all choose the same level of consump-
tion C.
Let’s now turn to the supply side of the goods market. The real marginal
cost of producing one unit of a good for every farmer equals the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure (the shadow cost of labor
supply) divided by the marginal product of labor:
MCYki  C
e
akYki
. (8)
We write the desired price of farmer i in sector k as:
P* ki
P
 mkMCYki. (9)
The relative price of any good is a markup mk times the real marginal cost of
producing the good. The markup mk can capture many possible market struc-
tures from standard monopoly (which here implies mk  
/(
  1)) to com-
3. For a derivation of these price indices, see either the original article by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) or a textbook treatment, such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 664).
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of economic activity.
4 We express this as
mk  Y
ke
k
where k is a random variable capturing shocks to the markup. The parameter
k governs the cyclical sensitivity of the markups in sector k, and it can be either
positive or negative.
We can now solve for the economy’s equilibrium. Using the pricing
equation (9), the demand function for variety i in sector k (7), and the market-
clearing conditions that Cki  Yki and C  Y, we obtain the following equation
for the log of the equilibrium price:
5
p* k  p  ky 
k  ak   logk
1  

, (10)
where k  (  k  )/(1  
) and y  log(Y). In this general equilibrium
model, an increase in output inﬂuences equilibrium prices both because it raises
marginal cost and because it inﬂuences the markup. Increases in markups or
declines in productivity both lead to an increase in the price that ﬁrms desire
to set.
It will prove convenient to have a log-linearized version of the aggregate
price index. Letting p  log(P) and pk  log(Pk), a ﬁrst-order approximation
to the price index around the point with equal sectoral prices yields:
p  
k1
K
kpk.
This equation corresponds to the problem stated in Section 1.
Using this linearized equation for the price level, and the expression for the
equilibrium prices in each sector, we can solve for the natural output level as a
function of the parameters and shocks. The natural level (or efﬁcient level) of
output is deﬁned as the output level that would prevail if prices were fully
ﬂexible and the markup equalled one. If pk  p* k and mk  1, then output is:
y
N 
¥k1
K kak   logk
  
. (11)
The natural level of output is a weighted average of productivity across all the
sectors in the economy. The output gap x is then deﬁned as the difference
4. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) survey alternative theories of why markups may vary over
the business cycle. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and Steinsson (2003) consider how supply
shocks might be modelled as exogenous ﬂuctuations in the markup.
5. Since all ﬁrms in a sector are identical they all have the same desired price. The right-hand side
of the equation is the same for all i. Therefore we replace p* ki by p* k.
1065 Mankiw and Reis Inﬂation Target of a Central Bankbetween the actual output level y and the natural level y
N. Using the equation for
the log of the equilibrium price, we ﬁnd that:
p* k  p  kx  k, (12)
where k  ky
N  [k  ak   log(k)]/(1  
) is a random variable. The
supply shock k reﬂects stochastic ﬂuctuations in the markup as well as shocks
to productivity in sector k relative to the economy’s productivity shock reﬂected
in y
N. This is the equation for the desired price posited in the previous section.
Notice that the shocks k reﬂect sectoral productivity shocks and markup
shocks. In general, the problem imposes no structure on the variance-covariance
matrix of the k. However, in the special case where there are no markups, so
mk  1, one can show that ¥ kk  0. Later, we will discuss the implications
of this special case.
2.2 The Economy With Nominal Rigidities
We now introduce nominal rigidities into the economy. We assume that al-
though all ﬁrms in sector k have the same desired price p* k, only a fraction k has
updated information and is able to set its actual price equal to its desired price.
The remaining 1  k ﬁrms must set their prices without current information
and thus set their prices at E(p* k). Using a log-linear approximation for the
sectoral price level similar to the one used above for the overall price level, we
obtain
pk  kp* k  1  kEp* k.
The sectoral price is a weighted average of the actual desired price and the
expected desired price. As we noted earlier, this kind of price rigidity can be
justiﬁed on the basis of nominal contracts as in Fischer (1977) or information
lags as in Mankiw and Reis (2002).
The equilibrium in this economy involves K  2 key variables: all the
sectoral prices pk and the two aggregate variables p and y. The above equation
for pk provides K equations (once we substitute in for p* k). The equation for the
aggregate price index provides another equation:
p  
k1
K
kpk.
The last equation comes from the policymaker’s choice of a nominal anchor:

k1
K
	kpk  0.
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transmission mechanism between the instruments of monetary policy and the
level of prices. Instead, our focus is on the choice of a particular policy target,
which here is represented by the weights 	k.
The choice of weights depends on the policymaker’s objective function. In
this economy, since all agents are ex ante identical, a natural welfare measure
is the sum over all households’ utility functions. Since Y  C in equilibrium, we
can express this utilitarian social welfare function as:
U 
Y
1
1  
 
k1
K  Lkidi.
In the Appendix, we take a second-order logarithmic approximation to this
utility function around expected output to obtain that expected utility is propor-
tional to:
EU  Varx 


1  
  
EVarkxk  EkVarixki	 (13)
where Vark stands for the cross-sectional dispersion across sectors, Vari the
dispersion across ﬁrms within a sector, and Ek the cross-sectional average
across sectors. Expected utility depends on the variance of the output gap and
on the dispersion of the output gap across sectors and ﬁrms. The dispersion of
output gets a smaller weight in the welfare function if consumers are more risk
averse (so  is larger) or if the goods are more substitutable (so 
 is larger).
In Section 1 we assumed the central bank’s objective function is Var(x), the
variance of the output gap. This is similar to Equation (13), but it omits the term
involving the cross-sectional dispersion of output. In the remainder of this paper
we continue with this simplifying assumption, for two reasons.
6
First, this assumption connects our problem more closely to the issues
facing real monetary policymakers. In our experience, central bankers are more
concerned with stability in aggregate economic activity than they are with the
distribution of output across ﬁrms. Academic discussions of monetary policy
sometimes emphasize cross-sectional effects because these effects arise in
canonical models. The practical importance of such effects, however, is open to
debate.
Second, the simpler objective function allows us to establish some theoret-
ical results that are intuitive and easy to interpret. Extending the results to the
case where the central bank takes both terms into account in designing optimal
policy would certainly be a useful exercise, but the extra complexity would
likely preclude clean analytic results. In Section 5 we compare our results to
6. Of course, we are not the ﬁrst study of optimal monetary policy to assume that the central
bank’s goal is to minimize the volatility of economic activity. For example, see Fischer’s (1977)
classic analysis.
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to that in Equation (13).
The bottom line from this analysis is that the stability-price-index problem
stated in Section 1 is closely related to a reduced form of a model of price
adjustment under monopolistic competition. The canonical models in this liter-
ature assume symmetry across sectors in order to keep the analysis simple (e.g.,
Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987; Ball and Romer 1990). Yet sectoral differences
are at the heart of our problem. Therefore, we have extended the analysis to
allow for a rich set of sectoral characteristics, which are described by the
parameters k, k, k, and k
2.
3. The Two-Sector Solution
We are now interested in solving the central bank’s problem. To recap, it is:
min
	k
Varx
subject to

k1
K
	kpk  0

k1
K
	k  1
pk  kp* k  1  kEp* k
p* k  p  kx  k
p  
k1
K
kpk.
The central bank chooses a target price index to minimize output volatility,
given the constraints imposed by the price-setting process.
To illustrate the nature of the solution, we now make the simplifying
assumptions that there are only two sectors (K  2), which we call sector A and
sector B, and that the shocks to each sector (A and B) are uncorrelated. We also
assume that A and B are both nonnegative. Appendix 2 derives the solution to
this special case. The conclusion is the following equation for the optimal
weight on sector A:
	* A  B
AB
2  AAAB
2  BA
2
BA1  BA
2  AB1  AB
2 .
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and, in general, need not be between 0 and 1.
From this equation, we can derive several propositions that shed light on the
nature of the solution. We begin with a very special case. Of course, if the two
sectors are identical (same k, k, k, and k
2), then the stability price index gives
them equal weight (	* k  1⁄2). This result is not surprising, as it merely reﬂects
the symmetry of the two sectors.
More interesting results arise when the sectoral characteristics (k, k, k,
and k
2) vary. Let’s start with the two characteristics that describe equilibrium
prices:
PROPOSITION 1 An increase in k raises the optimal 	k. That is, the more
responsive a sector is to the business cycle, the more weight that sector’s price
should receive in the stability price index.
PROPOSITION 2 An increase in k
2 reduces the optimal 	k. That is, the greater the
magnitude of idiosyncratic shocks in a sector, the less weight that sector’s price
should receive in the stability price index.
Both of these propositions can be viewed from a signal-extraction perspective:
A sector’s price is useful for a central bank when its signal about the output gap
is high (as measured by k) and when its noise is low (as measured by k
2).
Propositions 1 and 2 both coincide with aspects of the conventional wisdom.
When economists point to commodity prices as a useful economic indicator for
monetary policy, they usually do so on the grounds that these prices are
particularly responsive to the business cycle. The index of leading indicators, for
instance, includes the change in “sensitive materials prices.” Proposition 1 can
be used to justify this approach. At the same time, when economists reduce the
weight they give to certain sectors, as they do with food and energy sectors in
the computation of the core CPI, they do so on the grounds that these sectors are
subject to particularly large sector-speciﬁc shocks. Proposition 2 can be used to
justify this approach.
Let’s now consider the effects of price sluggishness on the optimal target
weights:
PROPOSITION 3 If the optimal weight for a sector is less than 100 percent (	k 

1), then an increase in k reduces the optimal 	k. That is, the more ﬂexible a
sector’s price, the less weight that sector’s price should receive in the stability
price index.
As earlier, some intuition for this result comes from thinking about the problem
from a signal-extraction perspective. Price stickiness dampens the effect of the
business cycle on a sector’s price. Conversely, when prices are very sticky, a
small price movement signals a large movement in the sector’s desired price,
1069 Mankiw and Reis Inﬂation Target of a Central Bankwhich in turn reﬂects economic activity. An optimizing central bank offsets the
effect of this dampening from price stickiness by giving a greater weight to
stickier sectors.
A special case is noteworthy:
PROPOSITION 4 If the two sectors are identical in all respects except one has full
price ﬂexibility (same k, k, and k
2 but A  1, B 
 1), then the monetary
authority should target the price level in the sticky-price sector (	B  1).
This result is parallel to that presented by Aoki (2001). But the very strong
conclusion that the central bank should completely ignore the ﬂexible-price
sector does not generalize beyond the case of otherwise identical sectors. Even
if a sector has fully ﬂexible prices, the optimal target weight for that sector is in
general nonzero.
The last sectoral characteristic to consider is k, the weight that the sector
receives in the consumer price index.
PROPOSITION 5 An increase in k reduces the optimal 	k. That is, the more
important a price is in the consumer price index, the less weight that sector’s
price should receive in the stability price index.
This proposition is probably the least intuitive one. It illustrates that choosing a
price index to aim for economic stability is very different than choosing a price
index to measure the cost of living.
What is the intuition behind this surprising result? Under inﬂation targeting,
undesirable ﬂuctuations in output arise when there are shocks k to equilibrium
prices, which the central bank has to offset with monetary policy. The effect of
a shock in sector k depends on the consumption weight k. The greater is the
consumption weight, the more the shock feeds into other prices in the economy,
and the more disruptive it is. Thus, to minimize the disruptive effect of a shock,
a central bank should accommodate shocks to large sectors. Under inﬂation
targeting, such accommodation is possible by reducing the weight of the sector
in the target index. Hence, holding all the other parameters constant, sectors
with a larger weight in the consumption index should receive a smaller weight
in the target index.
7
To sum up, the ideal sectoral prices for a central bank to monitor are those
that are highly sensitive to the economy (large k), experience few sectoral
shocks (small k
2), have very sluggish prices (low k), and are relatively small
in the aggregate price index (small k). It is important to acknowledge, however,
that these results depend on the assumption that the correlation between the k
7. The idea of giving a large weight to a small sector may sound implausible at ﬁrst, but that is
precisely the policy that many nations adopted during the nineteenth century. Under a gold
standard, the small gold sector receives a target weight of 100 percent.
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Proposition 1 still holds since one can show that 	k/k  0, so the optimal
target weight does not decrease as a sector’s cyclical sensitivity increases.
Moreover, if the sectors are identical in all respects except that in one sector
prices are fully ﬂexible, optimal policy targets the sticky price alone, as in
Proposition 4. In the empirical application next, however, we ﬁnd that the
off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix do not inﬂuence the most
important conclusions. So perhaps the special case highlighted in Propositions
1 through 5 is empirically plausible.
Another noteworthy special case is the one in which ¥ kk  0. In the
microfoundations developed in Section 2, this case arises if there are produc-
tivity shocks but no markup shocks. In this special case, one can show that
	* A  A
B1  A
A1  B  AB  A
. (14)
The optimal target weight rises with decreases in k as before, but now it rises
with increases in A. These results are parallel to those in Benigno (2001). In
addition, if one sector has ﬂexible prices, then optimal policy targets the
sticky-price sector. This case corresponds most closely to the one studied by
Aoki (2001).
4. Toward Implementation: An Example
The two-sector example considered in the previous section is useful for guiding
intuition, but if a central bank is to compute a stability price index, it will need
to go beyond this simple case. In this section, we take a small step toward a
more realistic implementation of the stability price index.
4.1 The Approach
We apply the model to annual data for the U.S. economy from 1957 to 2001. We
examine four sectoral prices: the price of food, the price of energy, the price of
other goods and services, and the level of nominal wages. The ﬁrst three prices
are categories of the consumer price index, while wages refer to compensation
per hour in the business sector. As a proxy for the output gap, we use twice the
deviation of unemployment from its trend value, where the trend is computed
using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
8 All series come from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
8. The factor of two corrects for an Okun’s law relationship and only affects the estimated k but
not the target weights. We also tried estimating x using detrended output and obtained similar
results.
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noting the following equation holds in the model:
pk  Epk  kp  Ep  kkx  Ex  kk  Ek. (15)
That is, the price surprise in sector k is related to the overall price surprise, the
output surprise, and the shock. To obtain these surprise variables, we regressed
each of the variables pk, p, and x on three of its own lags, a constant, and a time
trend and took the residual. These surprise variables are the data used in all
subsequent calculations.
In principle, one should be able to obtain the parameters by estimating
Equation (15). In practice, the identiﬁcation problem makes formal estimation
difﬁcult. Shocks (such as an energy price increase) will likely be correlated with
the overall price level and the level of economic activity. Finding appropriate
instruments is a task we leave for future work. Here, as a ﬁrst pass, we adopt a
cruder approach that is akin to a back-of-the-envelope calculation.
For the parameter k, which governs the degree of price sluggishness, we
rely on bald, but we hope realistic, assumptions. We assume the food and energy
prices are completely ﬂexible, so k  1. Other prices and wages are assumed
to be equally sluggish. We set k  1⁄2, indicating that half of price setters in
these sectors base their prices based on expected, rather than actual, economic
conditions.
Another key parameter is k, the sensitivity of desired prices to the level of
economic activity. We estimate this parameter by assuming that the 1982
economic downturn—the so-called Volcker recession—was driven by monetary
policy, rather than sectoral supply shocks. Thus, we pick k for each sector so
that Equation (15) without any residual holds exactly for 1982. That is, we are
using the price responses during the 1982 recession to measure the cyclical
sensitivity of sectoral prices.
With k and k, we can compute a time series of k  Ek and, thus, its
variance-covariance matrix. Note that we do not assume that the shocks are
uncorrelated across sectors. The previous section made this assumption to obtain
easily interpretable theoretical results, but for a more realistic numerical exer-
cise, it is better to use the actual covariances. Thus, if there is some shock that
inﬂuences desired prices in all sectors (for a given p and y), this shock would
show up in the variance-covariance matrix, including the off-diagonal elements.
The last parameter is the consumption weight k. We take this parameter
from the “relative importance” of each sector in the consumer price index as
determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For nominal wages, k is equal to
zero, because nominal wages do not appear in the consumer price index.
With all the parameters in hand, it is now a straightforward numerical
exercise to ﬁnd the set of target weights 	k that solves the stability-price-index
problem as set forth above. Appendix 3 describes the algorithm.
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Table 1 presents the results from this exercise. The column denoted 	
c imposes
the constraint that all the sectoral weights in the stability price index be
nonnegative. The column denoted 	
u, allows the possibility of negative weights.
The substantive result is similar in the two cases: The price index that the central
bank should use to maximize economic stability gives most of its weight to the
level of nominal wages.
The intuition behind this result is easy to see. The value of k for nominal
wages is 0.29, which is larger than the parameter for most other sectors. (This
parameter value reﬂects the well-known fact that real wages are procyclical.
9)
The only other sector that exhibits such a large value of k is the energy sector.
But the variance of shocks in the energy sector, measured by Var(k), is very
large, making it an undesirable sector for the stability price index. The combi-
nation of high k and low Var(k) makes nominal wages a particularly useful
addition to the stability price index.
10
One might suspect that the zero value of k for nominal wages in the
consumer price index is largely responsible for the high value of 	k in the
stability price index. That turns out not to be the case. Table 2 performs the same
empirical exercise as in Table 1, but it assumes that the economy’s true price
index gives half its weight to nominal wages (that is, p  0.5w  0.5cpi). Once
9. The estimate of the procyclicality of real wages we obtained here is similar to those found in
other studies. Because k for nominal wages exceeds the k for other goods by 0.19, the desired
real wage rises by 0.19 percent for every 1 percentage point increase in the output gap. If k equals
0.5 for these two sectors, as we have assumed, then the actual real wage would rise by 0.095. For
comparison, Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) estimate the elasticity of real wages with respect to
output in aggregate data is 0.146.
10. Indeed, if a better index of wages were available, it would likely be more procyclical,
reinforcing our conclusion. See Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) on how composition bias masks
some of the procyclicality of real wages.
TABLE 1. RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION
Sector Var() 	
u 	
c 	
0
Energy 1.0 0.37 0.00279 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.01
Food 1.0 0.10 0.00025 0.15 0.37 0.21 0.10
Other goods 0.5 0.10 0.00016 0.78 0.73 0 0.07
Wages 0.5 0.29 0.00050 0 1.26 0.76 0.96
Correlation matrix of epsilon
Energy Food Other goods Wages
Energy 1.00 0.27 0.19 0.17
Food 1.00 0.24 0.03
Other goods 1.00 0.30
Wages 1.00
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nominal wages.
11
Two other striking results in Table 1 are the large weight on the price of
food and the large, negative weight on the price of goods other than food and
energy. These results depend crucially on the pattern of correlations among the
estimated shocks. The last column in Tables 1 and 2, denoted 	
0 sets these
correlations to zero. The target weights for food and other goods are much closer
to zero (while the target weight for nominal wages remains close to one).
12 In
light of this sensitivity, this aspect of the results should be treated with caution.
One clear lesson is that the variance-covariance matrix of the shocks is a key
input into the optimal choice of a price index. The large weight on nominal
wages, however, appears robust.
It is worth noting that the gain in economic stability from targeting the
stability price index rather than the consumer price index is large. It is straight-
forward to calculate the variance of output under each of the two policy rules.
According to this model, moving from a target for the consumer price index to
a target for the stability price index reduces the output gap variance by 53
percent (or by 49 percent with a nonnegativity constraint on the weights). Thus,
the central bank’s choice of a price index to monitor inﬂation is an issue of
substantial economic signiﬁcance.
11. How is the approximate irrelevance of k here consistent with Proposition 5? The proposition
examines what happens to 	k when k changes, holding constant other parameter values. But in this
empirical exercise, if we change the weight given to some sector in the price index p, we also
change the estimated values of k and the variance-covariance matrix of k.
12. Although it is not easy to gain intuition for why the off-diagonal elements of the covariance
matrix have the effect they do, here is our conjecture: The largest correlation in Table 1 is the 0.30
between the shock to wages and the shock to the prices of other goods. Thus, the stability price
index, which gives a high weight to wages, tries to “purge” the shock to wages by giving a negative
weight to the price of other goods. More generally, when there is correlation among sectors, the
stability price index tries to choose the combination of prices such that shocks among the sectors
are offsetting in the overall index.
TABLE 2. RESULTS WITH ALTERNATIVE PRICE INDEX
Sector Var() 	
u 	
c 	
0
Energy 1.0 0.33 0.00319 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.04
Food 1.0 0.06 0.00030 0.08 0.32 0.2 0.07
Other goods 0.5 0.07 0.00023 0.39 0.55 0 0
Wages 0.5 0.26 0.00028 0.50 1.16 0.78 0.89
Correlation matrix of epsilon
Energy Food Other goods Wages
Energy 1.00 0.01 0.42 0.12
Food 1.00 0.03 0.28
Other goods 1.00 0.02
Wages 1.00
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as the price of equities. Although stock prices experience large idiosyncratic
shocks (high k
2), they are also very cyclically sensitive (high k). As a result,
it is plausible that the stability price index should give some weight to such asset
prices. When we added the S&P 500 price index to the sectoral prices used in
Table 1, it received a target weight that was positive and around 0.2. The target
weight on nominal wages remained large.
Finally, we should emphasize how tentative these calculations are. Our
attempt at measuring the key sectoral parameters is certainly crude. Future work
could aim at ﬁnding better econometric techniques to measure these parameters.
Once credible estimation procedures are in hand, one could expand the list of
candidate prices.
5. Relationship to the Previous Literature
The idea that a central bank should look beyond the consumer price index when
monitoring inﬂation is not a new one. For example, in 1978 Phelps concluded,
“the program envisioned here aims to stabilize wages on a level or a rising path,
leaving the price level to be buffeted by supply shocks and exchange-rate
disturbances.”
13 In Mankiw and Reis (2003) we explored a model that supports
Phelps’s policy prescription. That model can be viewed as a special case of the
stability-price index framework considered here, with some strong restrictions
on the parameter values. If Sector A is the labor market and sector B is the goods
market, then the earlier model can be written in a form such that A  1, B 
1, B  0, and A
2  0. In this special case, the equation for the optimal target
weight immediately implies that 	* A  1.
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) have recently also found that optimal
monetary policy can be closely approximated by targeting the nominal wage.
Their analysis differs substantially from ours. Whereas our calculations in
Section 4 treat wages in exactly the same way as any other sectoral price, Erceg
et al. focus instead on the speciﬁc features of the labor market, where nominal
rigidities induce distortions in labor-leisure choices and shocks feed into the
other sectors in the economy via wages and costs. Our argument for nominal
wage targeting can be seen as complementary to theirs, further strengthening
their conclusion.
The modern literature has also recently taken up the question of how should
monetary policy be set if there are different sectors in the economy. Aoki (2001)
studies optimal monetary policy in an economy with two sectors: one with
perfectly ﬂexible prices and the other with some nominal rigidity. He ﬁnds that
the central bank should target the sticky-price sector only. We obtain this same
13. Phelps has told us that this idea dates back to Keynes, but we have not been able to ﬁnd a
reference.
1075 Mankiw and Reis Inﬂation Target of a Central Bankresult, but only in the special cases either where the two sectors were identical
in all other respects, as stated in Proposition 4, or where there are only
productivity shocks.
Benigno (2001) focuses instead on the problem facing a currency union
with two regions. Even though his model has richer microfoundations than ours,
we are able to reproduce two of his main conclusions within our simple
framework. Benigno does not include markup shocks, focussing only on the
presence of disturbances that correspond to our productivity shocks. He ﬁnds
that the larger the weight of a sector in the economy is, the larger the weight it
should receive in the stability price index, as we found in Section 3 when only
productivity shocks were present. In addition, he shows that if the degree of
nominal rigidity in the two sectors is the same, then the optimal policy is to
target the CPI, regardless of any other differences between the sectors. If there
are only productivity shocks, our model leads to this conclusion as well. Both
Aoki and Benigno used models different from ours, notably by introducing
nominal rigidities in the form of Calvo staggered pricing rather than predeter-
mined prices as we do,
14 and by using a different objective function for the
policymaker. Nonetheless, their conclusions carry over to our setting.
6. Conclusion
Economists have long recognized that price indices designed to measure the cost
of living may not be the right ones for the purposes of conducting monetary
policy. This intuitive insight is behind the many attempts to measure “core
inﬂation.” Yet, as Wynne (1999) notes in his survey of the topic, the literature
on core inﬂation has usually taken a statistical approach without much basis in
monetary theory. As a result, measures of core inﬂation often seem like answers
in search of well-posed questions.
The price index proposed in this paper can be viewed as an approach to
measuring core inﬂation that is grounded in the monetary theory of the business
cycle. The stability price index is the weighted average of prices that, if kept on
target, leads to the greatest stability in economic activity. The weights used to
construct such a price index depend on sectoral characteristics that differ
markedly from those relevant for measuring the cost of living.
Calculating a stability price index is not an easy task. Measuring all the
relevant sectoral characteristics is an econometric challenge. Moreover, there
are surely important dynamics in the price-setting decision that we have omitted
in our simple model. Yet, if the calculations performed in this paper are
indicative, the topic is well worth pursuing. The potential improvement in
14. For a comparison of the different properties of “sticky price” and “sticky information”
models of nominal rigidities, see Mankiw and Reis (2002).
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consumer price index, appears large.
Our results suggest that a central bank that wants to achieve maximum
stability of economic activity should give substantial weight to the growth in
nominal wages when monitoring inﬂation. This conclusion follows from the fact
that wages are more cyclically sensitive than most other prices in the economy
(which is another way of stating the well-known fact that the real wage is
procyclical). Moreover, compared to other cyclically sensitive prices, wages are
not subject to large idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, if nominal wages are falling
relative to other prices, it indicates a cyclical downturn, which in turn calls for
more aggressive monetary expansion. Conversely, when wages are rising faster
than other prices, targeting the stability price index requires tighter monetary
policy than does conventional inﬂation targeting.
An example of this phenomenon occurred in the United States during the
second half of the 1990s. Here are the U.S. inﬂation rates as measured by the
consumer price index and an index of compensation per hour:
Consider how a monetary policymaker in 1998 would have reacted to these data.
Under conventional inﬂation targeting, inﬂation would have seemed very much
in control, as the CPI inﬂation rate of 1.5 percent was the lowest in many years.
By contrast, a policymaker trying to target a stability price index would have
observed accelerating wage inﬂation. He would have reacted by slowing money
growth and raising interest rates (a policy move that in fact occurred two years
later). Would such attention to a stability price index have restrained the
exuberance of the 1990s boom and avoided the recession that began the next
decade? There is no way to know for sure, but the hypothesis is intriguing.
Appendix 1: Approximation of the Utility Function
In this appendix, following Woodford (2002), we derive the objective function
of the policymaker as a Taylor second-order log-linear approximation of the
utility function. This extends the multisector analysis of Benigno (2001) to the
case where there are markup shocks in addition to productivity shocks.
The ﬁrst issue to address is the choice of the point around which to linearize.
Year CPI Wages
1995 2.8 2.1
1996 2.9 3.1
1997 2.3 3.0
1998 1.5 5.4
1999 2.2 4.4
2000 3.3 6.3
2001 2.8 5.8
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economy with ﬂexible prices and no real disturbances, so that all shocks are at
their means. As Woodford discusses, it is important for the accuracy of the
log-linearization that this is close enough to the efﬁcient equilibrium of the
economy. To ensure this is the case, we assume the average markup is one for
all sectors: E(mk)  1. One way to make this consistent with the monopolistic
competition model is to introduce a production subsidy to ﬁrms funded by
lump-sum taxes on consumers.
15
In order to interpret k as the share of a sector in total output, units must be
chosen appropriately so that all steady-state equilibrium sectoral prices p k are
the same. From Equation (10), this requires that units of measurement be such
that average productivity respects the condition:
a k    y    logk.( A.1)
The y  must be the same across sectors, and corresponds to the level of aggregate
output around which we linearize y. From the demand functions in Equation (7),
the equilibrium ﬁrm and sector output levels are y ki  y k  y   log(k).
We can now turn to the linearization of the utility function:
U 
Y
1
1  
 
k1
K 
0
1
Lkidi,( A.2)
which we do in a sequence of steps.
Step 1: Approximating Y
1/(1  )
A second-order linear approximation of y around y , letting y ˆ  y  y  yields
Y
1
1  

e
1 y
1  

e
1 y 
1  1  1  y ˆ 
1  
2
2
y ˆ
2 (A.3)
 e
1 y y ˆ 
1  
2
y ˆ
2.
The approximation in the last line involves dropping a term that enters the
expression additively and which the policymaker cannot affect. Therefore, it
does not inﬂuence the results from the optimization and can be dropped.
15. Alternatively we could allow the markups to be of ﬁrst or higher stochastic order.
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Inverting the production function in (6) we obtain:
Lki 
e
ak
1  
Yki
1.
A ﬁrst-order approximation of this around y ki and a k, letting y ˆki  yki  y ki and
a ˆk  ak  a k leads to:
Lki 
1
1  
e
ak1 yki

e
a k1y ki
1   1  a ˆk 
1
2
a ˆk
2  1  y ˆki 
1  
2
2
y ˆki
2  1  a ˆky ˆki
 e
a k1 y kiy ˆki 
1  
2
y ˆki
2  a ˆ ky ˆki,
where again in the last line, we drop additive constants that are independent of
policy.
Step 3: Integrating to Obtain  Lkidi
Integrating the previous expression over the farmers i in sector k, leads to:
 Lkidi  e
a k1 y kiy ˆki 
1  
2
y ˆki
2  a ˆ ky ˆkidi.
Since y ki  y k, and denoting by Ei(y ˆki) y ˆkidi the cross-sectional average of
output across ﬁrms in sector k, we obtain:
 Lkidi  e
a k1 y kEiy ˆki 
1  
2
Eiy ˆki
2  a ˆ kEiy ˆki.
From the deﬁnition of the cross-sectional variance, Vari(yki)  Ei(y ˆki
2) 
Ei(y ˆki)
2, so:
 Lkidi  e
a k1 y kEiy ˆki 
1  
2
Variy ˆki  Eiy ˆki
2  a ˆ kEiy ˆki.
(A.4)
Next, realize that a second-order approximation of the CES aggregator in
Equation (5), around y ki  y k yields:
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1  

1
2
Variy ˆki.
Using this expression to substitute for Ei(y ˆki) in Equation (A.4), rearranging and
dropping third- or higher-order terms, we obtain:
 Lkidi  e
a k1 y ky ˆk 
1  
2
y ˆk
2 


1  
2
Variy ˆki  a ˆ ky ˆk.
Step 4: Adding to Obtain ¥Lkidi
Adding up the expression above over the k sectors, we obtain:

k1
K  Lkidi  
k1
K
e
a k1 y ky ˆk 
1  
2
y ˆk
2 


1  
2
Variy ˆki  a ˆ ky ˆk
Since y k  y   log(k), Equation (A.1) implies that a k  (1  )y k  (1  )y  
log(k). Therefore:

k1
K  Lkidi  e
1 y  
k1
K
ky ˆk 
1  
2
y ˆk
2 


1  
2
Variy ˆki  a ˆ ky ˆk
 e
1 y Eky ˆk 
1  
2
Eky ˆk
2



1  
2
EkVariy ˆki  Eka ˆ ky ˆk,
where the cross-sectional average of output across sectors is denoted by:
Ek(y ˆk)  ¥k1
K ky ˆk.
Approximating the terms in the CES aggregator in Equation (4) around y k 
y   log(k) we obtain:
Eky ˆk  y ˆ 
1  

1
2
Varky ˆk.( A.5)
Using this to replace for Ek(y ˆk) in the expression above and dropping third- or
higher-order terms leads to:

k1
K  Lkidi  e
1 y y ˆ 
1  
2
y ˆ
2 


1  
2
 Varky ˆk  EkVariy ˆki	  Eka ˆ ky ˆk.
(A.6)
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The second-order approximation of the utility function (A.2) is given by the sum
subtracting the result in (A.6) from (A.3). Cancelling terms we obtain:
U  e
1y    
2 y ˆ
2  2
Eka ˆky ˆk
  



1  
  
Varky ˆk
 EkVariy ˆki	.
Now focus on the term Ek(a ˆky ˆk). From (A.5), it is clear that y ˆEk(a ˆk) 
Ek(a ˆk)Ek(y ˆk), up to second-order terms. Therefore:
Eka ˆ ky ˆk  y ˆEka ˆ k  Eka ˆ ky ˆk  y ˆEka ˆ k
 y ˆEka ˆ k  Eka ˆ k  Eka ˆ ky ˆk  Eky ˆk	
From the deﬁnition of the natural rate in Equation (11), we can replace Ek(a ˆk)
in the expression above to obtain:
Eka ˆ ky ˆk  y ˆ  y ˆ
N  Covka ˆk, y ˆk,
where Covk(a ˆk, y ˆk)  Ek[(a ˆk  Ek(a ˆk))(y ˆk  Ek(y ˆk))] stands for the cross-
sectional covariance. Using this to replace for Ek(a ˆky ˆk) in our approximation of
the utility function, and adding a term involving y ˆ
N (which is beyond the control
of policy so leaves the maximization problem unchanged), leads to:
U  e
1y    
2 y ˆ  y ˆ
N
2 


1  
  

2 Covka ˆk, y ˆk


1  
 Varky ˆk  EkVariy ˆki.
Next, we simplify the term in the square brackets above. Since Vark(a ˆk)/
(

1  )
2 is beyond the control of the monetary policy, we can add it to
the term in brackets in the utility function to obtain:
2 Covka ˆ k, y ˆk


1  
 Varky ˆk  Varky ˆk 
a ˆ k


1  	.( A.7)
Now, we calculate the natural rate of output in each sector. From the demand
functions in (7), taking logs, at the natural rate equilibrium:
yk
N  
pk
N  p
N  logk  y
N.
Subtracting y k  log(k)  y  we obtain:
y ˆk
N  
pk
N  p
N  y ˆ
N.( A.8)
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are ﬂexible, and markups are 1:
1  
pk
N  p
N    y
N  ak   logk.
At the point of linearization, the condition above also holds but with the
stochastic variable ak replaced by its mean a k. In terms of deviations from the
equilibrium around which we linearize, the expression above becomes:
1  
pk
N  p
N    y ˆ
N  a ˆ k.( A.9)
Combining (A.8) and (A.9) substituting out for relative prices, we obtain:

a ˆk


1  
 y ˆk
N 
  

1


1  
y ˆ
N.
The expression in (A.7) can therefore be rewritten as:
Varky ˆk  y ˆk
N
Going back to the utility function we then have:
U  e
1y    
2 y  y
N
2 


1  
  
Varkyk  yk
N  EkVariy ˆki	.
We drop the hats from y  y
N and yk  yk
N since the conditions deﬁning the
equilibrium around which we linearize include the conditions deﬁning the
natural rate equilibrium. Finally, using the assumption that E(mk)  1 made in
the beginning of the appendix, the model in section 1 implies that E(y)  E(y
N).
This holds only up to second-order terms, since we use ﬁrst-order approxima-
tions to obtain the price index of the economy and the result E(log(mk))  0.
Taking expectations of the equation above, and dropping the proportionality
factor that is outside the inﬂuence of the policymaker, we can write the objective
of the policymaker setting his rule before observing the shocks as:
EU  Vary  y
N 


1  
  
EVarkyk  yk
N  EkVariy ˆki	.
Finally, note that y ki  y k for all i, so we can add it to the last cross-sectional
variance term. Moreover yki
N  yk
N since with perfect price ﬂexibility all ﬁrms
within a sector are identical and so have the same natural rate of output. We can
therefore replace all output variables by gap variables in the expression above
to obtain Equation (13) in the text.
Appendix 2: Results for the Two-Sector Case
In this appendix, we prove the results and propositions presented in Section 3 of
the text.
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First, express all variables as deviations from their expected value. Letting a
tilde over a variable denote its deviations from its expected value (x ˜  x 
E(x)), the model can be written as:
p ˜* k  p ˜  kx ˜  ˜ k
p ˜ k  kp ˜* k  1  kEp ˜* k
p ˜  Ap ˜ A  Bp ˜ B
0  	Ap ˜ A  	Bp ˜ B.
Next, we use the facts that (1) there are only 2 sectors in this application (k 
A, B), (2) the expected value of any variable with a tilde over it is zero, and (3)
the weights must sum to one, to re-express the system as:
p ˜ A  Ap ˜  Ax ˜  ˜ A
p ˜ B  Bp ˜  Bx ˜  ˜ B
p ˜  Ap ˜ A  1  Ap ˜ B
0  	Ap ˜ A  1  	Ap ˜ B.
This is a system of four equations in four variables (p ˜A, p ˜B, p ˜, x ˜). Solving for the
variable of interest x ˜, we obtain:
x ˜  
	A  BA  	A	A ˜A  1  	A  AA  	A	B ˜B
BB  	AAA  BB  AB	A  AB  A
(A.10)
The policymaker will then choose the weight 	A in order to minimize the
variance of the previous expression. Using the ﬁrst-order condition and rear-
ranging we ﬁnd the optimal 	* A given by:
	* A  B
AB
2  AAAB
2  BA
2
BA1  BA
2  AB1  AB
2 (A.11)
The optimal 	* B is just given by 	* B  1  	* A.
PROOF OF THE PROPOSITIONS
SPECIAL CASE: Using the values A  B, A
2  B
2, A  B, A  B  1⁄2 in
the formula for 	* A above we ﬁnd that 	* A  1⁄2.
1083 Mankiw and Reis Inﬂation Target of a Central BankPROPOSITION 1: Taking derivatives of (A.11) with respect to A,w eﬁnd that
	* A
A

BABA
2B
21  AA  1  AB
BA1  BA
2  A1  ABB
2
2
The denominator is clearly nonnegative, and so is the numerator since k  1
and k  1, so we can sign 	* A/A  0. By symmetry 	* B/B  0.
PROPOSITION 2: Taking derivatives of the solution (A.11):
	* A
A
2  
ABABB
21  AA  1  AB
BA1  BA
2  A1  ABB
2
2,
which by the same argument as in the previous proposition, implies 	* A/A
2 
0 (and 	* B/B
2  0 symmetrically).
PROPOSITION 3: Taking derivatives of 	* A with respect to A:
	* A
A
 
ABB
2BA
2  1  ABBA
2  AB
2	
BA1  BA
2  A1  ABB
2
2 .
From the solution for 	* A:
	* A  1 N
BA
2  1  ABBA
2  AB
2.
Therefore, as long as 	* A 
 1, then 	* A/A 
 0. By symmetry it follows that
	* B/B 
 0.
PROPOSITION 4: Follows from evaluating the optimal solution 	* A at the point:
A  B, A
2  B
2, A  B  0.5, A  1, B 
 1, to obtain 	* A  0.
PROPOSITION 5: Taking derivatives of 	* A with respect to A, we obtain:
	* A
A
 
ABBA
2  AB
2
BAA
21  B  ABB
21  A
,
which is negative. Clearly 	* B/B is also negative.
The Stability Price Index with an Unrestricted Shock Covariance Matrix
Minimizing the variance of Equation (A.10) we obtain the optimal weight on
sector A:
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 B
AB
2  AAAB  B
2	  BAAA
2  AB  AB	
A1  ABB
2  A1  BAB	  B1  BAA
2  B1  AAB	
,
(A.12)
where AB denotes the covariance between  ˜A and  ˜B. Taking derivatives of
(A.12) with respect to A we ﬁnd:
	* A
A

BAB1  AA  1  ABA
2B
2  AB
2 
A1  ABB
2  A1  BAB	  B1  BAA
2  B1  AAB	
2.
Clearly 	* A/A  0, and by symmetry 	* B/B  0, so Proposition 1 still
holds.
Evaluating the optimal solution 	* A in Equation (A.10) at the point: A 
B, A
2  B
2, A  B  0.5, A  1, B 
 1, we obtain 	* A  0, so Proposition
4 still holds.
Appendix 3: Multisector Problems
In this appendix, we describe how to ﬁnd the optimal price index in a K sector
problem as in Section 4 of the text. The algorithm has three steps. First, we solve
for the equilibrium output in the economy, by solving the set of K  2
equations:
p ˜ k  kp ˜  kx ˜  ˜ k, k  1 ,...,K
p ˜  
k1
K
kp ˜ k
0  
k1
K
	kp ˜ k.
in K  2 variables (x ˜, p ˜, and the p ˜k), for the variable x ˜, in terms of the
parameters and the innovations  ˜k. Second, we take the unconditional expecta-
tion of the square of x ˜, to obtain the variance of output as a function of k, k,
k, 	k and the variances k
2  E( ˜k
2) and covariances kj  E( ˜k ˜j):
Varx ˜  fk, k, k, 	k, k
2, kj.
Given values for (k, k, k, k
2, kj) the third step is to numerically minimize
1085 Mankiw and Reis Inﬂation Target of a Central Bankf with respect to the 	k, subject to the constraint that ¥k 	k  1, and possibly
additional nonnegativity constraints: 	k  0.
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